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A Matter of Approval 
 
 
A contract for the sale of a mixed farming property fronting the Murrumbidgee 
River provided the basis for a dispute that recently found its way to the High 
Court.  The decision is Park v Brothers [2005] HCA 73.  Although largely 
concerned with appellate court practice and procedure, the decision will also be 
of interest to those practising in property law and general contract law. 
 
Facts 
 
The potential buyer of the property was an experienced grower of rice and wheat.  
In pre-contractual conversations with the seller and the seller’s agent, the 
attributes of the property offered for sale were described as being the availability 
of water and the potential for rice production.  Due to the timing of the rice 
growing season, the agent explained that if a contract was signed it would 
provide for the buyer to immediately take possession of the property.  The 
evidence established that rural properties in this area were sometimes sold in the 
spring, just before the time when rice crops are planted, and it was not 
uncommon for buyers to be allowed immediate possession to grow crops. 
 
A contract was signed by the buyer on 12 September 2000.  The contract 
contained a number of special conditions, with special condition 24 proving to be 
central to this appeal.  This special condition provided that the buyer could enter 
the property at any time after the date of the contract to ‘work up grounds for 
crops such work to be at his expense and risk and in locations first approved by 
the vendor.’ 
 
The buyer entered the property on 12 September 2000 and commenced the work 
necessary to sow a rice crop.  Although no approval was either sought or 
obtained under special condition 24, there was no objection by the seller to the 
buyer’s actions.  The issue of prior approval of location was never raised by the 
seller either at the time or later. 
 
Although the contract provided for completion on 7 December 2000, disputes and 
litigation intervened with the result that completion did not take place until 24 
March 2001.  To understand the issue before the High Court, it is necessary to 
briefly describe both the disputes and the subsequent litigation. 
 
Disputes 
 
A number of disputes arose between the parties.  The most important dispute 
concerned a separate special condition in the contract obliging the buyer to 
reimburse the seller in respect of a sum of $150,000 paid to a local authority in 
connection with water supply.  The parties disagreed about when the obligation 
to reimburse fell due.  Due to these disputes, on 12 December 2000 the seller 
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purported to rescind the contract, and ordered the buyer to leave the property, 
which the buyer did.  On the basis that the contract had been rescinded, the 
seller refused to complete the contract. 
 
Pre-settlement litigation 
 
The buyer commenced in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales seeking a declaration that the seller’s purported rescission of the contract 
was ineffective and, if necessary, an order for specific performance.  On 27 
February 2001, Young J held in favour of the buyer without the necessity for 
making a formal decree for specific performance.  Following completion of the 
contract on 24 March 2001, the proceeding remained on foot to enable the buyer 
to pursue a claim for damages. 
 
Proceedings before Campbell J 
 
The proceedings next came before Campbell J, who dealt with various claims 
(both statutory and common law) by the buyer for damages.  Campbell J gave 
judgment in favour of the buyer, upholding most of their claims, and awarding 
damages in the total amount of $1,512,052 plus interest.  Of this sum, damages 
in the sum of $963,852 were awarded for a claim for loss of profits due to 
disruption of the buyer’s proposed cropping program in 2001-2002, due to the 
seller excluding the buyer from the property.  As subsequently noted by the High 
Court, the case before Campbell J proceeded as though approval or absence of 
approval, under special condition 24, was not an issue.  In fact, the need for prior 
approval under special condition 24 was never mentioned at the trial before 
Campbell J. 
 
New South Wales Court of Appeal 
 
The seller appealed against various aspects of the decision of Campbell J, on a 
number of grounds that were ultimately withdrawn, or that failed.  In the hearing 
in the Court of Appeal (Giles JA, Ipp JA, Wood CJ at CL), the seller sought leave 
to amend his notice of appeal on the ground that the buyer’s right to enter the 
property was limited to a right of entry to work up grounds for crops in locations 
approved by the seller, and there was no evidence that the seller had approved 
the locations which the buyer claimed they had intended to work up and in 
relation to which they claimed to have suffered loss in 2001-2002. 
 
This amendment was allowed by the Court of Appeal and subsequently became 
the basis on which the Court of Appeal upheld the appeal in part, and reduced 
the amount of the judgment to $464,641 plus interest. 
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High Court 
 
The buyer’s appeal to the High Court (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan 
and Heydon JJ) was concerned only with the reduction of the damages originally 
awarded for breach of contract.  The issue was whether the Court of Appeal 
should have reduced the damages claim on the basis that the buyer never 
sought, or obtained, the seller’s approval of the particular sites which they 
proposed to develop for the 2001-2002 rice crop. 
 
In a joint judgment, the High Court allowed the appeal and ordered that the 
orders of the New South Wales Court of Appeal be set aside.  As a matter of 
practice and procedure, it was not appropriate for the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal, as an appellate court, to allow an appeal on a new ground that was not 
raised at trial and that, if raised, could have been the subject of evidence.  As 
noted by the High Court: 
 
 The question was one of quantifying damages.  That could have involved assessing the 
 possibility, if any, that approval of the locations in question could properly have been 
 withheld.  If any argument about want of approval had been raised before Campbell J, 
 then it would have been necessary to explore, in evidence, the question whether there 
 was any ground upon which the respondent would, or might, reasonably have withheld 
 approval.  Instead the case proceeded as though approval, or absence of approval, of the 
 locations in question was not an issue.  The new point should not have been permitted to 
 be raised as an issue in the Court of Appeal because it was, by then, too late to deal with 
 it fairly. (at [47]) 
 
A requirement to act reasonably? 
 
As mentioned at the outset, this decision touches upon issues other than 
appellate court practice and procedure.  An issue of some significance for 
property practitioners is the construction of a requirement for ‘approval’ under a 
clause such as special condition 24. 
 
In the Court of Appeal, without expressing a preference for one view or the other, 
Giles JA noted that there were two possible views of the seller’s position under 
special condition 24.  Either the seller’s capacity to grant or refuse approval to 
development at a particular location was unfettered or, alternatively, by 
implication approval could not be withheld unreasonably.  Unfortunately, Giles JA 
did not specify whether the implication was being suggested as a matter of fact, 
or of law. 
 
At potential variance with the dichotomy of approach suggested by Giles JA, the 
observations of the High Court concerning the operation of special condition 24 
are revealing: 
 
 Special condition 24 must be construed in the light of the circumstances surrounding the 
 contract, and the purpose the condition was intended to serve.  The background to 
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 special condition 24 was that, the respondent being ill and unable to work the property 
 himself, it was in the mutual contemplation of the parties that whoever bought the 
 property would enter into possession immediately, and farm the land.  The time of year at 
 which the sale took place reinforced the importance of that aspect of the bargain.  No 
 doubt the appellants' right of access to the land to grow crops was a factor in the agreed 
 price.  At the same time, there could be a number of reasons why the contract might not 
 proceed to completion, and it was reasonable to protect the interests of the respondent 
 by reserving to him the power to approve, or withhold approval of, the locations at which 
 such activity was to occur.  Infrastructure, especially uncompleted infrastructure, would 
 not necessarily increase the value of the land.  It was foreseeable that the respondent 
 could suffer adverse consequences from development activity undertaken prior to 
 completion by the appellants.  At the same time, the respondent had told the appellants 
 that there was "plenty of land" available for development for rice growing and, provided 
 the respondent's interests were adequately protected, it is unlikely to have been the 
 intention of the parties that he could obstruct development unreasonably.  The 
 respondent was to approve the locations of any development, having regard to what the 
 proposed development involved.  The provision should be understood as meaning that 
 the respondent, in granting or withholding approval, was required to act reasonably, 
 having regard to the legitimate interests of the respondent which the requirement of 
 approval was there to protect. (at [39]) 
 
This finding that the seller, as a matter of construction, would be required to act 
reasonably in granting or withholding approval is not, in itself, surprising.  A 
similar result could have been achieved by the mechanism of an implied term, 
namely an implication, as a matter of fact, that the seller would exercise its rights 
reasonably under special condition 24, to give the contract business efficacy.  
Arguably, this may have constituted one of the alternatives referred to by Giles 
JA in the New South Wales Court of Appeal. 
 
However, if the High Court is indicating that it is appropriate for contractual 
provisions to be construed in light of the legitimate interests of the parties, the 
decision assumes greater significance.  Although these observations were obiter, 
if such an approach were to be uniformly adopted, it would represent a further 
widening in the gulf between the Australian and the English common law of 
contract.  The traditional English view being that contractual performance and the 
exercise of contractual rights and discretions are virtually unrestrained by 
considerations of the reasonable expectations or the legitimate interests of the 
other party to the contact. 
 
The High Court’s approach, in this instance, may also be seen by some as 
indicating a preference for a constructional approach rather than an implied term 
approach.  On a related front, this may well be a matter of some significance 
when the High Court is finally required to opine on the vexed issue whether 
contractual rights and obligations should be exercised in good faith. 
 
 
 
Bill Dixon 
Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology 
